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1. Introduction 
The federal state of Belgium is comprised of the Dutch speaking region of 
Flanders in the north and the French speaking southern region of Wallonia. The 
Brussels-Capital region, officially bilingual, is a mostly French speaking enclave 
within the Flemish region. There is a small German speaking community (1%) 
which administratively is part of the Walloon region. 
Each region has its own parliament, government, public administration and civil 
service. There is also a federal parliament and government which has mandates 
over parts of foreign affairs, defense, justice, finance, social security, public 
health, and internal affairs. 
Which political level (regional or federal) mandates which policy domain has 
been and remains an important political and economic debate in Belgium. Given 
this complexity, we have chosen to analyze perceptions and political will with 
regard to whistleblower protection separately for the public and the private 
sector. 
We present summaries for both parts first, and explain the methodology used to 
prepare this report. Then we proceed with the analysis of whistleblower 
protection in the Belgian public sector, and after that with the analysis for the 
private sector. Finally, we summarize in SWOTs and conclude with a suggested 
action plan for both sectors. 
 
 2 
Transparency International Belgium – Providing an Alternative to Silence 
 
2. Summary 
In the federal state Belgium, whistleblowing legislation exists at the Flemish 
level. The policy covers wrongdoing in the Flemish public sector, and stipulates a 
two-tiered approach (Vandekerckhove 2010): line manager or internal audit at 
the first tier, and the Flemish Ombudsperson at the second tier. The 
Ombudsperson reports to parliament, and data on how the policy works is 
available through the annual reports. 
At federal level, a number of Bills have been submitted over the past years. All 
but one of those mimic the Flemish whistleblowing legislation. The exception is 
the most recent Bill, indicating some political and institutional will at federal 
level. However, this current Bill seems to make procedures for whistleblowers 
too complex, and also lacks an identified body for investigating whistleblower 
concerns. 
There seem to be two urgent challenges with regard to public sector 
whistleblowing in Belgium. The first is to ensure an agency is identified in the 
federal whistleblowing Bills that can realistically investigate whistleblowing 
concerns. The second challenge, at Flemish level, is to improve remedies for the 
whistleblower by including confidentiality and reinstatement options. 
More long-term challenges include whistleblower protection at the level of the 
Brussels Capital community, at the level of the Walloon Region, and in the 
private sector. 
There seems to be a critical mass (i.e. a minimum amount) of political and 
institutional will at Flemish level to further improve whistleblowing1 practices 
and policies. At federal level, such a positive will seems to be growing at 
institutional level more than at political level. An important positive change in 
the Walloon press is the connotation of whistleblowing2 with civic responsibility 
and hence as pro-social behaviour. 
                                                        
1 The Dutch word for whistleblower is 'klokkenluider' which translates as 'bell 
ringer'. 
2 The French word for whistleblower is ‘lanceur d’alerte’ which translates as 
'alert launcher'. 
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Our research on the private sector finds that in Belgium, employees tend to raise 
their concerns about workplace malpractice in the wrong place, i.e. informally 
with people they trust but who may not be able to take the required action. 
There is no culture of silence, although whistleblowing hotlines are generally 
disliked and not used. 
There are currently no legal protections for private sector whistleblowers in 
Belgium. The routes suggested by policy makers are not viable for 
whistleblowers. Some progress has been made in the area of corporate 
governance, and companies tend to divide between pioneers and laggards in 
terms of internal whistleblowing policies. 
Strengthening the position of private sector whistleblowing cannot be a quick-
fix. However, there is a demand with different stakeholders to exchange 
examples and good practices. That is the area where short-term progress can be 
made, whilst developing a long-term strategy for legally strengthening the 
position of the whistleblower. 
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3. Methodology 
The aims of this report are to provide some insight into how political perception 
and policy on public sector whistleblowing is developing at various political 
levels, and to identify the positions of stakeholders in the private sector relative 
to internal whistleblowing and to investigate under what conditions 
whistleblowing could be supported by the private sector. 
For the analysis of the public sector, we have used document analysis. There is 
an abundance of reports and legislative Bills to sketch policy development at an 
suitable level for the purposes of this report. 
For the private sector part, we have used a combination of document analysis 
and expert interviews as methodologies. We used law texts and minutes of 
Parliamentary Q&A sessions to describe the position of policy makers towards 
private sector whistleblowing. We also conducted a document analysis of 20 
companies listed on Euronext Brussels. We used publicly available documents 
for this: corporate governance statements, annual reports, codes of conduct, and 
company websites. 
We also conducted 12 telephone interviews with experts in the fields of 
sustainability, compliance, HR, safety advice, risk management, quality control, 
ethics training, and auditing. They were either employed in these functions, did 
consultancy work, were board member, or were active within a professional 
body in Belgium. They were asked for their opinion as professionals, not for an 
official standpoint of their organisations. In order to facilitate conversation and 
allow the use of examples during the interviews, our interviewees were 
promised complete anonymity. We have also abstained from using any examples 
mentioned during the interviews, unless the case had been covered by the media. 
The methodologies used in this research have been approved by the Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Greenwich (London). Both the public 
sector and private sector parts of the analysis have been reviewed by experts. 
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4. Compilation, description and assessment of whistleblower 
protection laws 
All civil servants and public officials have the duty to report crimes they come 
across during the fulfilment of their mandate, to the Crown Prosecutor (Article 
29 Criminal Law). In reality, this old law remains irrelevant to the realities of 
concerns about malpractice people have at their workplace, regardless of 
whether the wrongdoing constitutes a crime or questionable behaviour. In fact, 
the history of Belgian whistleblowing policies starts in 1999, when a new 
coalition of liberal democrats, socialists, and greens stated the intention to 
‘install at every department a channel through which internal dysfunctions or 
malpractices could be forwarded in confidentiality’ (Verhofstadt 1999: 3).3 This 
intention can be seen as an extention of broader political institutional reforms 
within the context of New Public Management. The then Secretary of State 
Freddy Willockx perceived whistleblowing policies as a vital part of crisis 
management (Willockx 2000: 43-44). However, the past decade has seen a 
number of whistleblowing Bills being tabled in federal parliament. None of these 
has made it into legislation. This was different at Flemish level, where a Bill was 
introduced into Flemish parliament in 2003 (nrs 1658(2002-2003)/1 and 
1659(2002-2003)/1). It was unanimously approved by the commission for 
institutional reforms as well as at the plenary session (nr 51) in 2004. Hence we 
will first discuss whistleblowing legislation at the Flemish level before giving 
more detail on the developments at federal level. 
 
4.1. The Flemish Decree on Whistleblowing 
The Flemish Whistleblowing Decree of 2004 was implemented through two 
protocols: one between the Ombudsperson and the Flemish government (4 June 
2005), and one between IAVA (internal audit of the Flemish administration) and 
the Flemish Ombudsperson (17 May 2006). The policy is stipulated in the Civil 
Servant Statute (13 January 2006) under ART II. 2-4. 
                                                        
3 Our translation of ‘op elk departement een meldpunt waar op vertrouwelijke 
basis interne dysfuncties of mistoestanden kunnen worden doorgegeven.’ 
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Since then, former and current civil servants, contractual employees, and 
apprentices can raise a concern with their line manager, heads of unit, or directly 
to the internal audit of the Flemish administration (IAVA) if that superior is 
involved in the malpractice, or if raising the concern to the superior was 
unsatisfactory. In addition, one can raise the concern with the Flemish 
Ombudsperson when one experiences or fears retaliation. Besides this tiered 
route, if one has sound reasons to fear the line manager will try to prevent them 
from making a disclosure about crimes, the public servant has the duty to inform 
the Public Prosecutor.  
Besides broad coverage of people able to raise concern, the policy also has a 
broad subject matter. It stipulates that concerns can be raised about negligence, 
abuse, or crime within one’s unit. The Belgian Privacy Commission has 
commented that this is too broad (Belgian Privacy Commission 2007), and has 
advised to limit the subject matter to issues relating to internal accounting, 
auditing, corruption, financial malpractice, or other serious issues that needed to 
be stipulated in a code of conduct. None of the other actors experiences this as an 
issue. There is a renewed code of conduct (covers six areas, including speaking 
up and secrecy) as of 2010 (Bourgeois 2011). Also, a review of the 
whistleblowing policy conducted by the Ombudsperson and IAVA in 2010 states 
there is no discussion about what are cases of negligence, abuse or crime. These 
can be very concrete facts, but ‘negligence’ can also refer to an organization that 
does nothing to deal with a well-known problem of bullying in that organization 
(Ombudsperson 2011a). 
The policy stipulates a good faith requirement. Whistleblowers will not enjoy 
protection in cases of ‘bad faith, personal gain, or false disclosures that damage a 
department or person’.4 This formulation lacks the clear delineation of ‘honest 
belief’ which the TI Guidelines suggest. 
Protection can be asked when raising a concern with the Ombudsperson (verbal 
or in writing) about a possible malpractice or about retaliation. The 
Ombudsperson will carry out a preliminary screening of the issue before 
                                                        
4 Our translation of ‘gevallen van kwade trouw, persoonlijk voordeel of valse 
aangifte die een dienst of persoon schade toebrengen’ 
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granting protection. The Ombudsperson ensures concern is raised in good faith 
and is not obviously unfounded. Also, concerns cannot be raised anonymously. If 
protection is granted than this lasts until two years after the end of the 
investigation initiated by the Ombudsperson, and protects the whistleblower 
from any disciplinary procedure, overt or covert measures. Burden of proof rests 
with the ‘employer’. Specific for the protection granted by the Ombudsperson is 
that the head of Department and the Minister is notified that the whistleblower 
now enjoys protection. This raises an issue with regard to confidentiality which 
we will explain further on. 
The policy incentivizes internal whistleblowing. As with any citizen concern, the 
Ombudsperson upholds a claim or complaint only when it has been raised first 
with the agency about which one is making the complaint (Ombuds Decree 1998 
Art 13.2). With regard to whistleblowing, there might be good reasons why the 
whistleblower chose not to raise their concern inside first. The Ombudsperson 
will readily accept these, or advise the internal audit (IAVA) route. If the 
Ombudsperson regards the concern as founded, an investigation will follow. In 
practice, the Ombudsperson will ask IAVA to conduct the investigations. While 
the Ombudsperson is mandated to outsource the investigation to a private 
auditor firm, this only happens when specific expertise (eg IT forensics) is 
needed. 
IAVA and the Ombudsperson provide the external access for whistleblowers in 
the Flemish public services. IAVA is the centralized internal audit for all these 
services. It belongs to the Flemish administration but is operationally 
independent from any other unit, department, or agency within that 
administration. It would audit the audits of those public bodies that have their 
own internal audits, and is fully mandated to undertake forensic audits. The 
Ombudsperson on the other hand, is appointed by and reports to the Flemish 
Parliament. The implication is that the Ombudsperson includes some reporting 
on whistleblowing in its annual reports. These are publicly available. The 
Ombudsperson will formulate advice to improve the functioning of the public 
body from which the concern stems. 
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IAVA says it receives 10 to 15 whistleblower concerns per year, of which half 
provide enough information to start a forensic audit (Ombudsperson 2009). The 
annual reports of the Ombudsperson provide a resumé of the issue, escalation, 
and recommendations with regard to the whistleblowing cases. Table 1 gives an 
overview of number of whistleblowing cases upheld by the Ombudsperson. 
 
Table 1. Number of whistleblower protections granted by the Ombudsperson 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nr cases 5 2 1 0 0 3 
 
The peculiarity of the Flemish whistleblowing policy is that the Ombudsperson 
functions as the body that receives complaints about retaliation. If the 
Ombudsperson grants protection, it can put someone ‘safe’ in their job for two 
years. Yet something seemed to be going wrong there. In its annual report for 
2010, the Ombudsperson writes that a number of talks were held with some 
‘aspiring whistleblowers’ but that none of these wanted to come forward 
officially. The explanation given is that there remains a fear to bear the burdens 
of blowing the whistle all by themselves (Ombudsperson 2010a: 57). In its report 
for 2011, we read that in a limited number of preliminary investigations the 
decision was made in the interest of the whistleblower, not to start up the 
whistleblower protection (Ombudsperson 2011b: 27). This sounds odd. How 
could not granting protection be in the interest of the whistleblower? 
This has to do with the issue of confidentiality. If one raises concern with IAVA 
(internal audit), then confidentiality is guaranteed. In contrast, if the 
Ombudsperson granted protection, then the whistleblower’s superior, and the 
functional Minister will be informed that this person now enjoys protection. 
Obviously there is a loss of confidentiality in that case, at least on paper. This has 
very recently been amended (Flemish Parliament 1699 nr 3, 24 October 2012) as 
we will explain further. 
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Whistleblowers sometimes underestimate the ability of others to find out their 
identity. Sometimes wrongdoers guess. In other situations the whistleblower will 
have expressed concerns or asked questions about the appropriateness of a 
particular practice. If they later on blow the whistle to an agency that comes in to 
investigate that practice, it can be very obvious who the whistleblower was. In 
those cases, even the strictest confidentiality will not keep the whistleblower 
unidentified within his or her organization. One could argue that ‘waiving’ a 
written notification that ‘someone is keeping an eye on this’ serves as a better 
protection for the whistleblower. 
Clearly, in 2010 and 2011, some whistleblowers were scared off by this 
approach, and in some other cases, even the Ombudsperson thought this would 
expose the whistleblower to a higher risk of retaliation. 
In its Planning 2010-2016 the Flemish Ombudsperson explicitly states it is not 
including short-term initiatives to improve whistleblower protection 
(Ombudsperson 2010a). The document refers to fear and suffering as the 
reasons why so few whistleblowers come forward. It suggests that perhaps the 
best way to lower these thresholds is the open the route for voluntary re-
employment within the Flemish public sector. 
The Flemish whistleblowing policy was reviewed in 2010 (Ombudsperson 
2011a). This review finds that the policy was successful in avoiding abuse of the 
whistleblowing policy. It leads the ombudsman (Bart Weekers) to maintain 
stipulations in the policy on scope and good faith requirements. 
There is some discussion in the review with regard to the coverage of the policy. 
The Ombudsperson's mandate also covers city councils. Hence citizens can make 
complaints about these local units to the Ombudsperson. Thus in theory these 
local units should also be covered by the Ombudsperson with regard to 
whistleblowing. However, the protocol (Ombudsperson 2009: appendix 3) for 
cities seeking coverage by the Ombudsperson states that whistleblowing 
concerns will not be dealt with. The review (Ombudsperson 2011a) states that 
the whistleblowing policy seems to work less well in correlation with size and 
isolation of the unit. Hence the ombudsman writes that many units at local level 
are not yet fit for whistleblowing policies. 
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The most important aspect of the review is the recommendation for a change to 
the mandate of the Ombudsperson. In order to improve the ability of 
whistleblowers to move on with their lives and careers, and in order to 
compensate for the weaknesses in protection, the review suggests to include in 
the protection measures the possibility of a re-employment of the whistleblower 
elsewhere in the Flemish public sector. It further suggests leaving out the 
requirement to inform the whistleblower’s superior of the protection. This 
would create the flexibility for the Ombudsperson to decide case-by-case and in 
collaboration with the whistleblower, on how to make protection more effective. 
In a very recent session - 24 October 2012 - the Flemish Parliament has 
approved a number of amendments (1699(2011-2012)/nr3) to the 
whistleblowing policy for Flemish civil servants implemented through the 
Decree on the Ombudsperson. This latest development improves whistleblower 
protection in three ways. 
First, limitations for concerns or complaints that can be taken up by the 
Ombudsperson have been removed, thereby broadening the scope of concerns 
that can be taken up by the Ombudsperson. 
Second, the stipulation that the Ombudsperson must inform the whistleblower's 
superior that the whistleblower enjoys protection is removed. The implication is 
that the Ombudsperson can now decide case-by-case and in the interest of the 
whistleblower whether or not to disclose the identity of the whistleblower and 
inform the head of department that the whistleblower enjoys protection. 
Third, re-employment of the whistleblower (if the whistleblower wants this) in 
another organisation within the Flemish public sector is now inscribed as one of 
the protection measures. 
This indicates the policy review has been very effective in leading to pragmatic 
piecemeal legislative changes. 
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4.2. Federal Bills5 
There have been seven whistleblowing Bills at federal level, one in 2005 (Senate 
nr 3-1288/1), one in 2007 (Senate nr 4-338/1), one in 2009 (House of 
Representatives DOC 52-2337/001), two in 2010 (Senate nr 5-217/1 and House 
of Representatives DOC 53-0316/001), one in 2011 (Senate nr 5-217/2), and 
one in 2012 (Senate nr 5-1491/1). Christian Democrats have submitted Bills in 
the Senate, and the Greens in the House of Representatives and in the Senate in 
2012. The 2011 Bill is the only one to have been discussed. 
All but one of these Bills (the 2011 Bill) are very similar. The reason is that they 
are resubmissions of a previous Bill after new elections: in the Senate, the 2010 
Bill is a resubmission of the 2007 Bill, which is a resubmission of the 2005 Bill; 
and the 2012 Bill is the same as the 2010 Bill in the House of Representatives; 
the 2010 Bill in the House of Representatives is a resubmission of the 2009 Bill. 
All of these consist of a proposal to put in place the same whistleblowing policy 
at federal level as the existing one at Flemish level. They seek to expand the 
mandate of the federal ombudspersons to be a recipient for federal civil servants’ 
whistleblowing concerns and offer them protection. The 2010 Bill in the House 
of Representatives is still ‘hanging’ and has not yet been discussed in a 
commission. 
The 2011 Bill in the Senate is technically an amendment to the 2010 Bill in the 
Senate, but de facto amounts to a new separate law. In March 2012 it was 
discussed in the Commission for Internal Affairs and Administrative Matters, 
where the decision was made to ask for external advice from the Council of State, 
which issued its advice (nrs 51.084 & 51.085) in November 2012 (Belgian Senate 
5-217/3, 18 December 2012). The thrust of the advice is that the proposed 
reporting procedures are too complex. The stipulations with regard to time 
frames and types of information for a qualified report and investigation increase 
the risk that a genuine whistleblower might lose their protection due to a 
procedural error. The Council of State also advises that the proposed scheme 
should be tabled as a new Bill rather than an amendment to a previous one, and 
                                                        
5 Due to recent legislative developments the chapter on federal Bills is no longer 
accurate. Click here to view the latest version of the Bill (5-217/9). 
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that this new Bill should include an explanation of aim and justification for each 
article. Overall, the advice is an important step which is promising, but it also 
means whistleblower legislation at the federal level is not likely before the next 
elections in 2014. Nevertheless, this is the furthest a whistleblowing Bill has 
come at federal level. Hence we will describe and comment on this proposed 
policy. 
The proposed policy has broad coverage. It would apply to statutory and 
contractual employees, and apprentices working in a federal administrative 
department. The subject matter is broad as well. The policy covers ‘suspected 
breaches of integrity’, meaning breaches of legislation, decisions, circulars, 
internal regulations and internal procedures, inacceptable risks to life, health, or 
safety of persons or the environment, breach of professional duties, and advising 
or ordering someone to commit a breach of integrity. It does not cover 
discrimination. Also important to note is that the proposal explicitly states 
motivation is not a criterion (Art.5) but uses the phrases ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
and ‘honest belief’ as necessary criteria. 
The policy stipulates a two-tiered approach. At the first (internal) tier (Art.6.1), 
an employee can raise a concern with his line manager who is obliged to treat 
this confidentially and is responsible for safeguarding that employee from 
reprisals. Alternatively, if the employee desires, concerns can be raised with the 
Confidential Advisor Integrity of the department where the employee works. 
The second (external) tier (Art.6.2), consist of a ‘central recipient for suspected 
breaches of integrity’ which would be installed with the federal ombudsperson, 
who is appointed by and reports to parliament. Whistleblowers can access the 
second tier if: 1) there is no confidential advisor within the federal department 
where they work, 2) if they do not wish to raise their concern internally, 3) if the 
head of the department where they work is involved in the suspected 
wrongdoing, or 4) if the suspected wrongdoing takes place in a different federal 
department than the one they work in. 
The formalities for raising a concern about a suspected breach of integrity are 
stipulated in Art.7 to Art.9. This is a rather complex matter. A whistleblower who 
wants to raise a concern internally needs to ask – in writing – for a preliminary 
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advice from the confidential advisor. When one wants to access the external tier, 
one needs to ask a preliminary advice from the federal ombudsperson. This 
request for advice requires the whistleblower to provide elements that show the 
suspicion of wrongdoing is based on a reasonable and honest belief. The 
recipient of the request for advice can invite the whistleblower for further 
clarification of the concerns before delivering the written advice to the 
whistleblower. A positive advice will be given if the recipient finds the concern 
substantiated and formally correct. If the concern is found substantiated but not 
formally correct, the recipient will make recommendations to the whistleblower. 
The whistleblower can ask the federal ombudsman for advice if the confidential 
advisor has given a negative advice. 
Once a whistleblower has received a positive advice from the federal 
ombudsperson, they must then decide whether and how they want to make the 
disclosure.6 The whistleblower has to confirm they want to raise the concern 
they raised in the request for advice. If they do, it becomes a disclosure. This 
confirmation has to be done in writing and must include the choice to make an 
open or a confidential disclosure. In an open disclosure the identity of the 
whistleblower will not be kept confidential. 
The law proposal also includes stipulations about the investigation following a 
disclosure and the required elements of reporting on the investigation (Art.14 to 
Art.10), as well as stipulations with regard to the protection offered by the 
federal ombudsperson (Art.15 to Art.17). It is noteworthy that protection is 
offered not only to the whistleblower, but also to employees who were involved 
in the investigation, and any advisory employee to the whistleblower. None of 
these enjoy protection if they were involved in the alleged wrongdoing. 
In our view, the proposal contains both positive as well as problematic elements. 
Positive elements are: 
1. It encourages people to raise concern inside their department. The 
instatement of a confidential advisor is important to make this 
encouragement work, but it is crucial this advisory position would have 
                                                        
6 ‘advice’ is used as a translation for ‘avis’ and ‘advies’; ‘disclosure’ is used as 
translation for ‘dénonciation’ and ‘melding’. 
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enough independence. Perhaps this avenue would be more trusted if the 
advisory role would be linked to the internal departmental audit function. 
2. The external route is independent from the executive government, and 
reports to parliament. This also ensures that the public will at least be 
able to access some data on how the policy is working. 
3. The proposal has broad coverage and scope. As with the policy at Flemish 
level, this undercuts the opinion of the Privacy Commission that the scope 
of whistleblowing policies should be restricted to financial wrongdoing.  
4. Broad protection that is offered, not just to the whistleblower but also to 
those in an advisory role or involved in the investigation. Protection is 
offered against dismissal, demotion, missing promotion, disciplinary 
measures, denial of pay raise, unfavourable performance evaluation, 
withholding of access to facilities and training, and denial of annual leave.  
5. Motivation is explicitly ruled out as a ground for denying protection. 
Instead, honest belief and reasonable suspicion are used. 
6. There is at least the intention of the legislators to involve whistleblowers 
in the investigation.  
7. The whistleblower has the option to make either an identified or 
confidential disclosure. This might be another way to deal with the 
problem of (fear of) reprisals mentioned by the Flemish ombudsperson. 
Opting for the confidential route would allow the federal ombudsperson 
to launch an investigation without disclosing the identity of the 
whistleblower while still granting them protection. Under the current 
Flemish policy, the ombudsperson informs the whistleblower’s head of 
department that the whistleblower enjoys protection. The Flemish 
ombudsperson reports that this frightens off some potential 
whistleblowers from coming forward, hence why in a number of cases it 
was decided not to offer protection.  It seems the current federal Bill has 
taken this concern on board by offering a confidential route. 
 
In our opinion there are also some problematic aspects about the federal Bill:  
 15 
Transparency International Belgium – Providing an Alternative to Silence 
 
1. The proposed policy is preoccupied with the procedure to raise a concern. 
It stipulates many time restrictions – e.g. the recipient has two weeks 
after the request for advice has been made to invite the whistleblower for 
clarification and there is another two weeks to give to give clarification, 
the recipient then has another two weeks to formulate the advice, and 
another two to send it to the whistleblower, in the case of a negative 
advice from the confidential advisor the whistleblower has ten weeks to 
request advice from the federal ombudsman who has twelve weeks to 
respond, in the case of a positive advice the whistleblower has two weeks 
to confirm they want to make a disclosure, etc. There are also many 
stipulations with regard to necessary elements of a request for advice to 
qualify it as correct and hence acceptable, regardless whether or not the 
concern is deemed substantiated. The apparently zealous endeavour to 
provide a detailed procedure to raise concern might stem from an 
intention to close loopholes, but the upshot of overly detailed procedures 
is also a huge risk to the whistleblower, who might be denied of 
protection or investigation of their concern due to procedural errors. It 
seems these hurdles have been deliberately inserted into the proposed 
policy, so as to ‘avoid unnecessary disclosures’ (p18 in the commentary to 
the proposal).7 
2. The two stepped approach to raising a concern – first a written request 
for advice and then a written confirmation turning the advice into a 
disclosure – is a problematic and confusing element in the law proposal. 
While the two are consistently distinguished in the articles describing the 
procedure, the articles on protection only mention ‘disclosure’ (Art.15). 
Hence it is not clear if one would be entitled to protection for requesting 
an advice that was found correct and substantiated without having 
confirmed this as a disclosure. This will lead to problems in practice 
because (a) requests for advice need to be made in writing, hence these 
are on record, and (b) the whistleblower has only two weeks to confirm 
the disclosure upon receiving positive advice.  
                                                        
7 My translation of ‘L’on évite ainsi un afflux de dénonciations inutiles’ 
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3. The proposal contains a confusing stipulation relating to claims about 
reprisals (Art.16). The federal ombudsperson is the recipient for such 
claims, even when the concern was raised with the internal recipient. The 
confusion rests with the stipulation of the burden of proof. As it reads 
now, the whistleblower has to provide proof of actual or threatened 
reprisals, upon which the burden of proof is then reversed to the federal 
administration to show these reprisals are not happening.8  
4. In our view the most fundamental problem of the proposal is that it does 
not identify a body that can realistically carry out investigations in an 
effective and independent manner. The proposal foresees that the federal 
ombudsperson carries out the investigation, ‘if necessary assisted by 
experts’ (Art.11).9 The way the federal ombudsperson currently works 
will require such expert assistance in every whistleblowing case. If the 
federal ombudsperson takes up a citizen’s complaint about the 
functioning of a federal administrative department, it ‘investigates’ by 
written dialogue with the federal department at stake. It is obvious that 
this will not satisfy investigatory requirements of whistleblowing cases. 
Further, the federal ombudsperson aims at mediation and conflict 
resolution. This makes it the right candidate to offer protection and 
receive claims about reprisals, but not to carry out investigations. 
In the Flemish whistleblowing policy, it is also the ombudsperson who receives 
concerns or complaints about reprisals, and who offers protection. Investigations 
however are carried out by the Flemish internal audit (IAVA), or in specific cases 
(such as IT-forensic investigations) this is outsourced. This body is mandated to 
carry out forensic audits and overrides departmental internal audits. 
                                                        
8 My translation of ‘Si un member du personnel protégé par les médiateurs 
fédéraux peut apporter aux médiateurs fédéraux, au cours de la période de 
protection, des preuves suffisantes, fondées sur des éléments et des faits, de 
l’existence ou de la menace de mesures […] la charge de la preuve qu’aucune 
mesure ou menace de mesure n’est ou n’a été prise ou formulée incombe à 
l’autorité administrative fédérale […]’ 
9 My translation of ‘federale ombudsmannen en desgevallend de deskundigen die 
de federale ombudsmannen bijstaan’ 
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Unfortunately there is no parallel at federal level to the Flemish internal audit. 
There is a Federal Audit Committee (ACFO-CAAF). Since April 2010, this audit 
committee is comprised of seven independent experts who are not statutory 
employees but receive attendance fees. The Federal Audit Committee is 
respected as a source of expertise and advice for the departmental internal 
audits, but is not equipped to carry out forensic audits. Neither are the 
departmental internal audits the right body to carry out investigations ordered 
by the federal ombudsperson. Not only do they lack the required independence 
to achieve enough credibility for investigating whistleblowing concerns, but the 
reality is that only half of the federal administrative departments have internal 
audits, including those who outsourced the audit to a private firm (EU 
Compendium 2011: 36). 
The Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (CDBC-OCRC) is equipped to 
undertake the required investigations, but is only mandated to carry out judicial 
investigations, as it is part of the Director General of the Judicial Police. Its 
predecessor, the Superior Control Committee (HCT-CSC) resorted until 1997 
under the Prime Minister and was mandated to carry out administrative 
investigations in all public administrations. In response to some recent scandals, 
politicians from diverse parties suggested to restore the Superior Control 
Committee. It seems to us that this could be done rather easily. After all, the 
Superior Control Committee still exists as an entity, albeit void of any staff or 
resources. Hence it would suffice an executive decision to allocate resources and 
staff for a centralised investigatory body to become operational (TI 2012: 191-
194). In order to make the external whistleblowing tier effective at federal level, 
it seems inevitable to either consider this restoration idea seriously, or to set up 
a centralised internal audit in addition to the Federal Audit Committee. 
 
4.3. Auxiliary legislation 
There is no whistleblowing legislation covering the private sector in Belgium. 
However, some legislation aimed at specific wrongdoing has provisions that are 
either similar to whistleblowing or could be used by whistleblowers 
experiencing reprisals. We briefly describe these in this section. 
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Art.49 of the competition law of 2006 establishes a clemency regulation for 
companies who denounce a cartel they are part of, providing partial of full 
waiving of fines. In practice, the clemency regulation is referred to as the 
whistleblower policy (Wijckmans 2006, Wijckmans and Tuytschaever 2008)). 
Companies have to make a formal clemency request to the Belgian Competition 
Authority. Table 2 gives an overview of the number of clemency requests. 
 
Table 2. Overview of clemency requests (based on data from annual reports 
Belgian Competition Authority) 
year 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
nr of 
requests 
1 5 7 7 6 
 
The anti-money laundering law of 2010 (revising and renumber articles of the 
law of 11 January 1993), stipulates that financial professions have a duty to 
disclose suspicions of money laundering activities. These professions include 
bankers, insurance brokers, notaries, auditors, accountants, and tax consultants. 
They are obliged to disclose suspicions to the Belgian Financial Intelligence 
Processing Unit (CFI-CTIF). The law also stipulates such a duty for property 
brokers and lawyers. Lawyers need to disclose suspicions of money laundering 
with the Solicitor General of the Bar. 
Legislation covering both public and private sector which can be relevant for 
whistleblower experience retaliation is the law on prevention of psychosocial 
pressure caused by work of June 2007, which modifies the law of 2002. This is 
also known as the anti-mobbing law. The law stipulates organisations are 
required to have a prevention advisor on physical and psychological violence, 
sexual harassment, and bullying. The law also advises organisations to put in 
place a confidential advisor. These provide internal avenues for employees who 
wish to make a complaint. The law offers protection from dismissal for 
employees whose complaint is upheld, as well as for witnesses who testify in 
court. The available data covers number of cases per region, gender, sector, and 
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organisation size, and whether the complaint was about violence, sexual 
harassment, or bullying. It does not provide information to suggest how many of 
these were reprisals against whistleblowers.  
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5. Perceptions and political will with regard to whistleblower 
protection in the public sector 
This section will discuss public perception of and political will towards 
whistleblowing in the Belgian public sector. With regard to political will, we 
would like to distinguish between will of politicians and of actors in current and 
proposed whistleblowing policies. With actors we mean those who play a role in 
whistleblowing policies, either as recipients, administrators, or investigators. 
There seems to have been reached a critical mass of positive will for 
whistleblowing policies at actor level, and possibly this is starting to infect 
political will as well. This is most obvious at Flemish level. People from the 
internal audit (IAVA) and the ombudsperson show a highly professional attitude 
towards the role of whistleblowing in good governance. Rather than merely 
fulfilling their designated roles, these actors are actively seeking ways to 
improve the quality of whistleblowing practice, both in terms of investigation as 
well as protection for the whistleblower. In our view, IAVA should be seen as 
holding the expertise on whistleblowing in Belgium, and this expertise should be 
consulted when designing policies at other levels. IAVA is also heavily involved in 
preventative measures, i.e. bringing about cultural change in organisations with 
regard to people who raise concerns. Under the leadership of the newly 
appointed integrity coordinator in October 2010, IAVA had an important know-
how input in the creation of an additional centralised low-threshold recipient for 
questions and concerns related to integrity. An existing helpline for stress and 
other psychosocial issues at the workplace is being expanded to also offer advice 
on integrity issues. Together with the Central HR agency (AgO), IAVA also 
contributed to the creation of an integrity network within the various Flemish 
government institutions. This network, called the Virtual Bureau Integrity, was 
launched in January 2012, aims at being a platform for integrity actors. 
Prevention of whistleblowing conflict escalation is one of its points of attention. 
How does this affect political will? Obviously, the Flemish legislation came about 
through politicians, and IAVA's formation in 2006 was the result of political will. 
Yet the critical mass developed within and between institutions is important to 
sustain momentum of that political will. It is people within these institutions that 
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formulate proposals for piecemeal change and progress. The central low-
threshold helpline/advice/recipient as well as the Virtual Bureau Integrity 
would not have come about by political will alone, and given the delays with 
which these came about, it seems plausible that they have been actioned because 
of actors' persistence. 
At federal level the political will seems more ambivalent. The previous State 
Secretary for the Co-ordination of the Fight Against Fraud (Carl Devlies) 
explicitly supported whistleblowing policies. In response to a question posed to 
him in the Justice Commission of the House of Representatives in December 
2010, he said that it would be a great step forward if parliament would approve 
the then proposed whistleblowing regulation (Devlies 2010: 21). The current 
State Secretary John Crombez, however, responded to the TI NIS report for 
Belgium that a whistleblowing policy is definitely not a priority. He has stated 
this both in the press as well as in his answer to a question in the Senate on 7 
June 2012 (Crombez 2012: 14). Instead, the State Secretary sees the 
strengthening of the audit procedures as a better way to secure integrity. Also of 
little hope is the answer given by the previous Minister of Justice (Stefaan De 
Clerck) to a question posed to him in the Justice Commission of the Senate (De 
Clerck 2011: 36)), on the whistleblowers in the Hazodi case (see below for a 
discussion of that case). The Minister said that while a statute for whistleblowers 
is something that needed thought, there is also the concern about abuses of such 
a statute for personal or vindictive reasons. The combination of not seeing 
whistleblowing policies as a priority, and the immediate connotation of people 
abusing such a policy, could indicate a decrease of political will.  
On the other hand, within the administration there are clear signs of a growing 
will. There is now a platform where people from various federal departements 
can regularly meet to discuss and invite experts to talk on integrity related 
issues. 
There are no legislative initiatives at the level of the Brussels Capital Community. 
Neither are there any yet at the Walloon level. However, there are some – albeit 
minimal – indications of a positive evolution. As noted, whistleblowing Bills at 
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the federal level were co-signed by both Flemish as well as French speaking 
politicians of the Greens (Groen-Ecolo) and Christian Democrats (CD&V-Cdh).  
Also, on 30 November 2012, Transparency International organised a session on 
civil servants' duty to report wrongdoing and their need to be protected. The 
session was presided by Patrick Dupriez, President of the Walloon Parliament 
and member of the Greens (Ecolo). 
Finally, connotations in the press of the term whistleblowing – in its French 
equivalent of ‘donneur d’alerte’ or ‘lanceur d’alerte’10 – seem to be shifting from 
denunciator – dénonciateur – to citizens who speak out with regard to social or 
environmental concerns (see a special volume of Imagine, September 2009). Still, 
it seems the press in the Southern part of the country is somewhat 
underestimating whistleblowing. 
In contrast, the press in the Northern part of the country (the Flemish speaking 
part) appears to be overshooting the term whistleblowing – in its Dutch 
translation ‘klokkenluiden’.11 It is used for behaviours that technically have 
nothing to do with whistleblowing, like politicians who, in their oppositional role 
question members of executive, i.e. a member of the city council of Genk taking 
up a report on environmental health issues (Nieuwsblad 29 September 2010), or 
a whole political party tagged as whistleblower for taking up its oppositional role 
in a radical way in some cases (LDD in De Morgen 22 January 2011). This same 
political party (LDD – a small libertarian party) has marketed itself as 
whistleblower on several occasions since. Nevertheless, the term is widely used 
in press reports on both public and private sector cases of corruption or fraud, 
which shows the term is growing some currency in the Flemish press. 
Although the arrest of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Martin 
Tillack (STERN journalist) vs Belgium is internationally regarded as an 
important Belgian whistleblowing case (he was arrested by the Belgian police 
and the case resolved around protection of journalists’ sources), it received little 
coverage in the Belgian press. The most recent whistleblowing case which 
received major coverage in press as well as on television, is the Hazodi case. 
                                                        
10 Translates as alarm launcher or giver. 
11 Translates as bell ringer. 
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The Hazodi case unspins as follows. Early 2009, four administrative employees 
of the Hazodi police zone (Hasselt, Zonhoven, Diepenbeek) make anonymous 
complaints to Prosecutor-General of Hasselt, Comité P (centralised internal audit 
of the police), and tax inspection. These consist of allegations about fraud with 
overwork payments, allowances for mileage, clothing, and food, dropping 
dossiers of theft and parking tickets, and exam fraud. After a number of these 
complaints, and some superfluous investigations, the Prosecutor-General drops 
charges against the chief of police, but recommends the police chief would 
restore trust within the corps. The chief of police makes some restructurings, but 
these are not beneficial to the whistleblowers – perhaps they were not so 
anonymous after all. One gets dismissed and others are get a different job role. 
They perceive this a reprisal and raise their concerns with the prevention 
advisor. One of them also goes to the employment tribunal, which demands the 
chief of police to correct his decisions.  
At this stage, the police union (NSPV) supports the whistleblowers and send a 
dossier bundling 23 complaints to the Minister of Internal Affairs. Meanwhile, 
the Prosecutor-General is charging two of the whistleblowers with theft of 
confidential files (when they were collecting evidence for their fraud 
allegations). Early October 2011, a week before their trial for stealing 
confidential files, the whistleblowers go public. Panorama aired a documentary 
on the case, suggesting the Prosecutor-General of Hasselt is trying to ‘hush up’ 
the case. The Major of Hasselt – who is also overseeing the Hazodi police force, is 
interviewed on television, and does not seem to be aware of what is going on. 
Two days later, a private forensic auditing firm (i-Force) is contracted in to 
investigate the fraud concerns. A week later, the two whistleblowers are 
acquitted from the charges of theft of confidential files. 
At the end of October 2011, the Major of Hasselt suspends the chief of police. 
Early December 2011, i-Force issues its report on the investigation, stating that 
they have found frauds totalling €476.000 since 2006 within the Hazodi police 
force, thereby indicating the whistleblowers’ information was correct but at the 
same time suggesting three of the whistleblowers had also indirectly received 
illicit payments. 
 24 
Transparency International Belgium – Providing an Alternative to Silence 
 
In January 2012, the Public Prosecutor’s Office investigates the involvement of 
the Prosecutor-General of Hasselt in ‘hushing up’ the case. Their finding is that 
the Prosecutor-General did not make mistakes in handling the case. Meanwhile, 
former colleagues of the whistleblowers state through their union, that they do 
not want the whistleblowers reinstated in their jobs. In April 2012, one of the 
whistleblowers returns to work in the Hazodi police corps, in a different job and 
department as her previous role. The three others have found a job in police 
forces of Antwerp and at the federal level. Also, the Minister of Justice takes 
charge of the investigations upon the suspension of the chief of police, and later 
that month Comité P and the federal police search the offices of the Hazodi police 
force. In June 2012 it is announced that the chief of police remains suspended. 
While this case shows the wrongdoing was stopped in the end, and somehow the 
whistleblowers found a way to move on, the way this cases escalated leaves no 
winners. First, the whistleblowers had to expose their concerns and story in the 
media in order to attract public attention to the fact that they were being 
charged with stealing confidential files when gathering evidence of public 
interest wrongdoing. This show of protection-by-scandal is precisely what 
effective whistleblowing policies aim to prevent. Second, reputations of the 
whistleblowers, the magistrates in Hasselt, the Major of Hasselt, and the Hazodi 
police force were seriously damaged. When those in the Hazodi police corps said 
that they did not want the four to return to work with them, it was partly 
because they held the four whistleblowers responsible for their police force 
being perceived as ‘bad cops’, something these police officers found stressful to 
work under (Nieuwsblad 15 October 2011). 
A second important, although less mediatised case relates to whistleblower 
reprisal to a whistleblower in Xios, a poly-technic higher education institution. 
Apparently, the school’s social work department suffered from a malfunctioning 
organisational culture, where intimidation amongst staff and towards students 
was common (Ombudsperson 2011b: 19-20). Things escalated during an 
external validation process. A teacher approaches members of the validation 
commission to talk to them about her concerns. Colleagues see this. Soon after, 
teaching hours are taken away from this teacher and she gets relocated to a job 
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outside of the department. In September 2011 she requests protection from the 
Flemish Ombudsman, who upholds the request and after an investigation advises 
the school to reinstate the whistleblower in the department with her teaching 
hours. The Ombudsman’s advice is also sent to the Ministers of Education and of 
Government Administration, who also urge the school to act upon the advice. 
The school refuses to act upon this. However, the Ombudsman’s report on the 
case is taken up by the Provincial Council overseeing the school, and decides in 
June 2012 to merge Xios with another school as of the academic year 2012-2013, 
and appoints a new manager for the merged school. 
This case shows that if raising concern internally or to an audit (the external 
validation commission) cannot correct malpractice because of an internally 
corrupt culture, whistleblowing is not going to be easy. However, protection 
from the ombudsperson in this case, gives an immediate remedy for the 
whistleblower (job protection) and also takes away the burden for the 
whistleblower to carry the case further. Here, it was the Flemish Ombudsperson 
who initiated the investigation, and sent his advice to the school and the 
appropriate Ministers. The fact that the ombudsperson reports to parliament, 
makes sure that Ministers are informed wrongdoing which was not resolved 
internally has escalated, that these Ministers cannot simply neglect this advice, 
and that it can be mentioned in a publicly available report should the case not be 
resolved. Both in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of the investigation as well 
as burden on the whistleblowers, the two cases stand miles apart. 
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6. Perceptions and political will with regard to whistleblower 
protection in the private sector 
This section is structured as follows. We first analyse existing (or pseudo-
existing) regulatory policy of whistleblowing in the private sector. After that we 
present an overview of existing internal whistleblowing policies at company 
level. We then proceed with an evaluation of whistleblowing practice: whether 
policies work, management attitudes, what the different position are and who is 
taking these.  
6.1. Which regulatory policies exist? 
6.1.1. Labour Law 
At a Q&A session in the Belgian Senate in December 2006, the then Minister of 
Work (Peter Vanvelthoven, Socialist Party Sp.a) was asked what the difference 
was between the private and public sector in terms of legal protection for 
whistleblowers, whether he planned any initiative to improve whistleblower 
protection, and what his vision was on a specific statute for whistleblowers 
(Belgian Senate 2007a: 9129). 
The Minister responded that although there are no specific provisions in the 
Belgian employment law with regard to whistleblowing, a number of general 
principles can provide guidance. He names three such principles. The first is that 
employer and employee owe each other ‘awe and respect’ (art. 16 law of 3 July 
1978).12 The second principle the Minister of Work mentions as applicable to 
whistleblowers is that an employer cannot arbitrarily dismiss a worker (art. 63 
law of 3 July 1978). This law only applies to manual workers, but the Minister 
adds that administrative workers can access similar provisions under the ‘figure 
of legal abuse’.13 The third principle mentioned in the Minister’s reply is 
protection against workplace bullying implemented through the law of 4 August 
1996. 
                                                        
12 Our translation of ‘eerbied en achting’. 
13 Our translation of ‘figuur van het rechtsmisbruik’. 
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The Minister also replies that he is not aware of any court cases relating to 
private sector whistleblowing. His conclusion is that given the general principles 
already in place through the employment law, there is no reason to develop a 
specific statute for whistleblowers in the employment law. However, the 
assumptions on which Mr. Vanvelthoven bases his conclusion are mistaken. 
Let us take a closer look at the three general principles used to shed off 
responsibility for working out a specific whistleblowing policy. The ‘awe and 
respect’ stipulation in art. 16 of the law of 3 July 1978 remains too vague to be 
effectively used in relation to internal whistleblowing. The remainder of art.16 
states that during the execution of the contract employer and employee must act 
with decency and according to moral norms. There is nothing in art.16 that 
entices employers to define policies to manage conflicts escalating from workers 
who raise concerns. 
More to the point, art.17 of the same law (law of 3 July 1978) contains 
stipulations which could easily be used against whistleblowers. For example, 
par.2 of art.17 imposes a duty on employees to act according to orders and 
instructions from the employer or those delegated by the employer. Thus if an 
employer instructs an employee to act so as to cover-up wrongdoing, not 
following that instruction can be interpreted as a breach of contract. Par. 3a of 
art.17 imposes on employees a duty to refrain from making known company 
secrets, and personal or confidential data which the employee comes to know in 
the course of his or her employment. Again, this stipulation can be interpreted 
against whistleblowers, as it can be read as an implicit gagging-order. 
There is however a missed opportunity in art. 17 of the law of 3 July 1978. Par. 
3b imposes on employees a duty to refrain from committing or co-operating in 
acts of unfair competition. In a pro-social sense whistleblowing in the private 
sector, both internal as well as external, can be regarded as acting upon a refusal 
to collaborate in organisational practices amounting to unfair competition. It is 
conceptually possible to anchor whistleblowing policies for the private sector on 
this stipulation (par 3b art 17 law of 3 July 1978). This would promote an 
understanding of whistleblowing as conducive to open and fair markets. Such a 
phrasing would also focus more on the wrongdoing whistleblowers help to 
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identify (internally and externally) rather than on the reprisals whistleblowers 
often suffer. We admit freely here that this would not work where wrongdoing is 
harmful to the organisation but not to fair competition. 
The second principle – non-arbitrary dismissal of manual workers and figure of 
legal abuse for administrative workers – also focuses on the reprisals 
whistleblowers can suffer rather than their concerns of wrongdoing in their 
workplace. However, arbitrary dismissal is reminiscent of the US employment-
at-will doctrine which was a pivotal target for whistleblowing activism from the 
1970’s onwards (Vandekerckhove 2006). Restrictions on arbitrary dismissal 
offer scope for whistleblower protection in two ways. The first is that it can be 
used to incur litigation from an employer when things go wrong. The second is 
that it offers scope for on order to be reinstated into ones job. The latter rarely 
happens. One can argue that if whistleblowing escalates into a court case on 
unfair dismissal, considerable time will have elapsed from the moment when 
internally raising a concern started to go wrong, and also that the court case 
itself indicates the necessary trust between employee and employer is not 
reparable. 
A peculiar feat about Belgian employment law is that it distinguishes manual 
workers from administrative workers.14 The law of 3 July 1978 applies for 
manual workers only. Art. 63 of that law imposes a duty on the employer to 
motivate a dismissal. This can be related to the employee’s behaviour or attitude, 
or can stem from a necessity of the corporation or the department (for example a 
restructuring). In a dispute the onus of proof for the motivation is on the 
employer. Unmotivated dismissals can be sanctioned with a litigation of six 
months’ pay. Hence this is a de facto cap on litigation for a whistleblower – 
assuming he or she wins the case. 
However, the law of 3 July 1978 does not apply for administrative workers. In 
their case, the employer does not have a duty to motivate dismissals. With regard 
to administrative workers the employer has a right to dismiss. However, this 
right should not be abused. Hence the phrase ‘figure of legal abuse’ used by the 
                                                        
14 Manual worker is ‘arbeider’ in Dutch and ‘travailleur’ in French; administrative 
worker is ‘bediende’ in Dutch and ‘actionné’ in French. 
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Minister means the abuse of the right to dismiss. In disputes, the abuse of the 
employer’s right to dismiss is on the employee. The employee must show that his 
or her dismissal is not something an employer who acted with ‘due diligence’ 
would do, and that the dismissal has caused the employee damage beyond the 
normal damage associated with a dismissal (e.g. loss of income is not an 
abnormal damage). Best practice whistleblower policy puts the burden of proof 
on the employer to show the employee was dismissed for reasons other than 
raising a concern. Hence it comes over as odd that a policy maker would refer to 
the ‘figure of legal abuse’ as a general principle where whistleblowers can find 
protection. 
The third idea put forward as an avenue for whistleblower protection is through 
the anti-bullying or anti-harassment legislation. However, there is no data as to 
how many whistleblowers suffering reprisals have used this particular 
legislation or the internal organisational policies that come with the legislation. 
According to an expert interviewee, anti-harassment procedures are not easily 
accessible for whistleblowers. The procedures require someone to bring 
evidence of a pattern of behaviour. Reprisals against whistleblowers do not 
necessarily follow a straightforward pattern. The anti-harassment legislation 
does oblige organisations to mandate a prevention advisor and a confidential 
advisor (smaller organisations can use an external provider). These people can 
be a first contact person for whistleblowers suffering reprisals, but in order for 
them to start a procedure offering protection, there needs to be substantial 
evidence of a pattern of harassment. Hence the statement that this legislation 
provides an appropriate avenue for whistleblowers is not credible, especially 
since there is an absolute lack of data on this. 
Since Mr. Vanvelthoven (the then Minister of Work) stated in December 2006 
that he was not aware of any court case involving reprisals against 
whistleblowers, an interesting case was brought before the Labour Court in 
Liege in 2007 (Adriaens 2009). The case is interesting because it also shows how 
hard it is for an administrative employee to prove a misuse of the employer's 
right to dismiss. In September 2001, an administrative employee of a gas station 
was dismissed. He claims this was as a reprisal for raising a number of legitimate 
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questions and requests. In 1999, two years before his dismissal the employee 
had filed a complaint with the police after he had been attacked by a client. A 
couple of months later, labour inspection officers did an audit after his labour 
union had made a complaint. In March 2001 the employee had made a written 
grievance with regard to some irregularities regarding wages. In May 2001 the 
employee, together with a couple of colleagues, had made a written request to 
the employer to improve security measures around the back door of the gas 
station in order to avoid burglary. A week later the employee was attacked at 
night in the gas station, resulting in him being unfit for labour until 16 
September 2001. When returned to work on the 17th from sick leave, he was 
dismissed by his employer. 
The employee claimed abuse of the employer's right to dismiss, and disputed his 
dismissal in court. The employer claimed his dismissal had nothing to do with 
the issues the employee had previously raised, but rather were the outcome of a 
reorganisation of their gas stations. The Labour Court concluded that the 
employee had failed to prove legal abuse by his employer. They acknowledged 
the concerns the employee had raised were legitimate, but that he had not 
sufficiently proven a link between him raising those concerns and his dismissal. 
The Labour Court also reminded that in principle the employer has a right to 
dismiss (administrative employees), and that this cannot be checked by a judge 
(Adriaens 2009, commenting on A.R. 34.042/06, Labourt Court Liege 18 
September 2007). 
Without commenting further on the case, or questioning the judgement of the 
Labour Court, the case is stunning because it illustrates how difficult it might be 
for whistleblowers who suffer reprisals to prove this in court. In the same light it 
makes Mr. Vanvelthoven's claim that whistblowing administrative employees 
can draw on the 'figure of legal abuse' to find protection nonsense. 
 
6.1.2. Corporate Governance 
In 2004 the Corporate Governance Commission published a Code of Corporate 
Governance for publicly listed companies. In 2009 the Commission published an 
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updated code. The same wording is used: it requires listed companies to install 
an audit committee. One of its responsibilities is to monitor internal control 
systems. This includes reviewing 
the specific arrangements in place which the staff of the company may use, in confidence, 
to raise concerns about possible improprieties in financial reporting or other matters. If 
deemed necessary, arrangements should be made for proportionate and independent 
investigation of such matters, for appropriate follow-up action and arrangements whereby 
staff can inform the chairman of the audit committee directly. (Commissie Corporate 
Governance 2004: 5.2/9; 2009: 5.2/16 of appendix C) 
The law of 6 April 2010 on strengthening corporate governance in publicly listed 
corporations, combined with the Royal Decree of 6 June 2010 imposes a duty on 
listed corporations to publish a corporate governance statement, in which they 
identify the Belgian Corporate Governance Code 2009 as the code they apply, 
with a 'comply or explain' requirement. Although this does imply that the 
statement must include a description of the 'most important characteristics of 
the internal control and risk management systems of the corporation'15 - without 
specifying what the key characteristics are - the vast bulk of new requirements 
relate to transparency on remuneration of management and board members 
(Commissie Corporate Governance 2011b). 
Guidelines to the 2009 Code include a list of questions Boards of Directors can 
use to evaluate a company's internal control system. One suggested evaluation 
question under '3.4 Communication' (Commissie Corporate Governance 2011a: 
27) to the Audit Committee, which has the responsibility for ensuring 
appropriate internal control systems, is whether there exist means of 
communication for employees to report suspicions of inappropriate facts?16 
The public consultation on the Guidelines to the 2009 Code (Commissie 
Corporate Governance 2012) show there is a huge demand for examples, cases, 
and best practices on different aspects of internal control deemed important in 
the 2009 Code and guidelines, and there is a lot of willingness from respondents 
                                                        
15 My translation of 'belangrijkste kenmerken van de interne controle- en 
risicobeheerssystemen van de vennootschap'. 
16 My translation of 'Bestaan er communicatiemiddelen om vermoedens over 
ongepaste feiten aan het licht te brengen?' 
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in the public consultation to engage in workshops aimed at exchanging cases and 
best practices. This momentum provides an opportunity to further enhance the 
understanding of the benefits of internal whistleblowing. 
The FSMA - financial services regulator - did two studies to assess whether listed 
companies comply with the 2009 Code. The studies show an improvement. In 
2010 92% (compared to 46% in 2009) of the listed companies complied with 
2009 Code stipulation on describing the internal control systems in the 
corporate governance charter, at least as far as internal control systems relate to 
the process of financial reporting (FSMA 2011). 
The Belgian Corporate Governance Commission has also published a Code of 
Corporate Governance for non-listed corporations. The first was published in 
2005, and is known as the Code Buysse. In 2009 the Commission published an 
updated code, the Code Buysse II. None of these mention channels to 
communicate concerns about malpractice. 
 
6.2. Which corporate policies exist? 
The 2009 Corporate Governance Code requires listed companies to comment on 
their internal control system in their Corporate Governance Statement, including 
internal policies or procedures for workers to raise concerns (stipulation 5.2 and 
specified in 5.2/16 in Appendix C of the 2009 Code). The 2009 Code does not, 
however, prescribe in any way minimal requirements of such policies or 
procedures, nor does it prescribe a minimum description of the characteristics of 
those polices. Hence there is a huge variation in the amount of information 
companies give in their Corporate Governance Statements on their internal 
control systems, whether these include whistleblowing policies, and what these 
look like. 
Some more information can be found when we also look at companies' annual 
reports and what they make publicly available on the company website. Table 1 
 33 
Transparency International Belgium – Providing an Alternative to Silence 
 
gives an overview of information on internal whistleblowing policies of BEL20 
companies17 found in the course of this research. 
Table 3. Whistleblowing policies in BEL20 companies (based on public data) 
Company 
Name 
Sector Information found 
in 
Comment 
AB Inbev Brewery CG charter 2012 Hotline (24/7 telephone or 
internet), third party 
administered, confidential 
and anonymous concerns. 
Promise of non-retaliation 
(p33) 
Ackermans & 
van Haaren 
Holding none found online  
Ageas Insurance Annual Report 2011 Internal alert line for 
employees and others 
(appendix 10). Justifies not 
publishing policy on the 
website in terms of this 
would not help the issue 
(p35) 
Befimmo Industrial and 
office REITs 
Terms of Reference 
of the Audit 
Committee 2010 
Code of Ethics 2007 
One of the duties on the audit 
committe is to review 
specific arrangements 
through which employees or 
others can raise concerns in 
confidentiality (p3). 
Employees can 'apply to the 
Compliance Officer' for any 
suspected breaches of the 
code (p2 of the Code of 
Ethics) 
Bekaert Engineering  Code of conduct 
2009 (appendix 3 of 
CG Charter 2012) 
Policy identifies internal 
tiers: line manager, HR, 
Group Internal Audit. 
Promises confidentiality and 
non-retaliation (p11) 
Belgacom Telecom Website Alarm Bell Procedure for 
employees. Reports are made 
to compliance on breaches of 
code of conduct, law, and 
internal and external 
                                                        
17 The BEL20 is the benchmark stock market index for Euronext Brussels. It 
consists of a selection of companies traded on the Brussels Stock Exchange. It is a 
market-value weighted index deemed to be a representation of the Belgian 
equity market. Companies selected for the BEL20 are large cap and at least 15% 
of its shares must be free float. 
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regulations. 
Cofinimmo Industrial and 
office REITs 
Code of conduct 
2005 
Employees can inform 
compliance of 
'preoccupations about 
possible irregularities' (p15) 
Colruyt Food retail Internal Regulations 
of the Audit 
Committee (2006) 
Employees can report 
financial irregularities to the 
audit committee (p2) 
Delhaize Food retail Website Full policy details ('I Share 
Line') - specific European ISL 
procedure. 
Promise of confidentiality 
(anonymous possible) and 
non-retaliation. 
D'Ieteren Car retail Activity Report 2011 Reports that 20 calls were 
made in 2011 to the 'Speak 
Up Line', nine of which were 
deemed valid and have been 
investigated and resolved 
(p44). 
No description of policy at 
group level, but hotlines on 
website of Belron (92.7% 
owned by D'Ieteren) in 
Australia, New Zealand, UK, 
and USA. 
Elia Energy Compliance Office 
Report 2011 
Notes that after evaluation 
(2009 Code as benchmark) a 
recommendation was made 
that the company needs to 
implement a whistleblowing 
policy (p5) 
GBL Holding CG Charter 2011 'The Committee puts in place 
and ensures the proper 
application of a whistle 
blowing procedure' (p16) 
GDF Suez Energy Ethics Charter 2009 Uses wording in terms of 
establishing a culture. On the 
role of the Ethics Officer: 
'They also provide help and 
guidance to employees who 
ask or share concerns about 
ethical issues' (p20) 
KBC Financial 
services 
Group Compliance 
Rules 2010  
 
Group Compliance Rule 14 is 
a full whistleblowing policy. 
Tiered approach. Promise of 
non-retaliation.  
Mobistar Telecom CG Charter Mentions that Internal 
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Control includes evaluation 
of a whistleblowing policy, 
and that the Audit Committee 
will investigate and act upon 
reports of financial or other 
irregularities. (p26) 
Nyrstar Metal Code of Business 
Conduct 2011 
Full policy. Tiered approach: 
line manager, then 
compliance officer. 
Confidential or anonymous. 
Promise of non-retaliation, 
and feedback on action taken 
as a result of the report. 
Solvay Chemics & 
pharma 
Annual Report 2011 Hotline, third party 
administered. 'To voice any 
difficulties or pose questions 
in complete confidence' 
(p201). Unclear about how 
accessible the policy is: 'is 
progressively being made 
available to employees' 
(p200) 
Telenet Group Telecom Website States a whistleblowing 
policy is part of the code of 
conduct. No further 
information given. 
UCB Chemics & 
Pharma 
Annual Report 2011 UCB Integrity Line is a 24/7 
hotline. Employees 'are 
expected' to report 
suspected breaches via 
regular channels (line 
manager and HR), and only 
use the Integrity Line as a 
last resort. 
Policy was imposed through 
a Corporate Integrity 
Agreement (Office of 
Inspector General of the 
Dept. of Health and Human 
Services) as part of 
settlement in May 2011 with 
the authorities in the USA. 
Umicore Non-ferro Code of conduct States the company aims at 
establishing an open debate 
culture. In that context, 
employees are responsible 
for raising concerns with 
their line manager, local or 
regional HR, Corporate Legal, 
or Internal Audit, in a tiered 
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approach. Retaliation is 
explicitly stated as a breach 
of the Code of conduct. False 
reports will be sanctioned. 
 
There is a considerable variation both in terms of information made publicly 
available on the internal whistleblowing policy. In that light, BEL20 companies 
can be placed on a continuum, going from (1) companies giving no information 
or the bare minimum wording to comply with the 2009 Code, (2) companies 
mentioning explicitly that they have a whistleblowing policy or a Speak Up 
procedure but not giving further information, (3) companies that give some 
indication as to what kind of procedure they have implemented, to (4) 
companies that give a richer description of the procedure along with additional 
stipulations. Table 2 shows the resulting placing of the BEL20 companies on that 
continuum. 
 
Table 4. BEL20 companies continuum of richness in publicly available 
information on their whistleblowing policy 
Continuum descriptor Companies 
(1) no info or minimal compliance with 
2009 Code 
Ackermans & van Haaren, Befimmo 
(2) explicit mentioning of a policy but 
no info on policy 
Ageas, Cofinimmo, Colruyt, GBL,  Mobistar, 
Telenet 
(3) give an idea of kind of policy AB Inbev, Belgacom 
(4) rich description Bekaert, Delhaize, D'Ieteren (subsidiary 
company), GDF Suez, KBC, Nyrstar, Umicore 
Anomalies Elia, Solvay, UCB 
 
This categorisation needs to be read with some caution. For example, Ackermans 
& van Haaren is a holding. We did not find any reference to an internal procedure 
at holding level. This does not imply that none of the subsidiaries have such 
procedures. However, our limited research did not come across any. Compared 
to the other holding in the BEL20, GBL, the only difference is that GBL states 
their audit committee puts in place and assures the proper functioning of a 
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whistleblowing procedure. Yet we did not find any further information or 
description of what that policy might look like. 
Another reason why we must caution the reader is that there are no guarantees 
that the publicly available information (or the lack of it) on a company's 
whistleblowing policy is indeed representative of the attitude of management 
and board towards the value of internal whistleblowing. This was confirmed by 
our expert interviewees. Three interviewees stated that there is often a 
discrepancy between what is externally communicated and what is internally 
practiced. A possible explanation for this could be that departments who train 
and monitor on compliance and integrity - and hence who operate internal 
whistleblowing policies - have another drive and discourse than the departments 
who formulate the company's external communication. 
Three other expert interviewees said that corporate governance charters and 
related statements are often the result of combining different 'flavours', namely 
that of international group level management and that of local Belgian 
management. One can read the core idea in the policy, but how this is acted out 
at a concrete organisational level is always dependent on the interpretation of 
that core idea by local management. This is even more likely to be the case where 
USA and UK cultures mingle with continental cultures, for example after a 
merger. 
A further three interviewees explained that representativeness of public 
communication on these issues very much depended on the target audience of 
that communication. In that light, a company might be putting effort into 
implementing an internal procedure, but if it is not to be used by non-employees 
then the company might see no reason to publish its policy on its public website. 
There might also be differences in terms of where a company's most important 
stakeholders resign. A company oriented towards the USA would then be more 
incentivized in externally communicating about its efforts on providing ways for 
employees to raise concerns than a company with no or very little exposure to 
those markets and authorities. 
Thus we cannot conclude that companies that do not provide publicly available 
information about their whistleblowing procedures do not have them. 
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Nevertheless, there remain interesting features in the policies that are more 
openly communicated. Let us first comment on the anomalies listed in table 4. 
Elia notes that they are lacking an internal whistleblowing policy. From what 
Solvay notes we can infer that it is currently working at implementing a 
whistleblowing policy. Finally, UCB had a policy imposed as part of a settlement 
with the USA authorities. These are clear indications that at least until 2011 not 
all BEL20 companies had internal policies. 
From those listed in table 4 as offering a rich description of their internal policy 
we can infer some patterns. We make these inferences based on important 
elements in internal whistleblowing policies identified in Vandekerckhove and 
Lewis (2012). 
One of the important elements in whistleblowing policies relates to the roles and 
responsibilities whistleblowing procedures attribute to specific organisational 
functions. Policies differ on whether they channel all concern to a specialised 
body or rather distribute responsibilities making the proper functioning of 
internal whistleblowing a shared concern within the organisation. Bekaert, 
Delhaize, KBC, Nyrstar, and Umicore make explicit reference to a tiered 
approach. The internal tiers are typically line manager, HR, compliance officer, 
internal audit. Delhaize lists all these as a first tier and places its 'I Share Line' as 
an additional channel. Umicore makes an explicit reference to its aim of 
establishing an open debate culture, but the culture-approach is even more 
pronounced and elaborated on in the GDF Suez Ethics Charter. 
A second element of whistleblowing policies we comment on here relates to 
whether concerns can be raised confidential, anonymous, or both. Bekaert and 
D'Ieteren only use the term 'confidential'. Delhaize and Nyrstar explicitly 
mention the possibility of both raising concerns confidentially or anonymously. 
A third important policy element relates to the protection of whistleblowers. 
Within organisations this amounts to an explicit promise of non-retaliation. 
Bekaert, Delhaize, GDF Suez, KBC, Nyrstar, and Umicore all explicitly promise 
non-retaliation. 
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Other elements identified as important in Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2012) 
relate to registering of concerns, monitoring and review of the policy. D'Ieteren 
was the only company offering some data on the number of cases reported 
through their hotline and the number of investigated cases. None of the 
companies we researched provided information on how they monitor the 
operation of their whistleblowing procedures, or on who is involved in reviewing 
them. 
A further important policy element is the training provided to employees and 
managers on internal whistleblowing. Some companies mention training 
vaguely, but no information on specific ethics or integrity training relating to 
internal control systems is provided. 
A final important element we wish to comment on relates to whether raising 
concerns is formulated as an obligation or duty, or not. There is growing 
academic literature raising questions about formulating whistleblowing as a 
general employee duty. Tsahuridu and Vandekerckhove (2008) and 
Vandekerckhove and Tsahuridu (2010) have argued the risks for whistleblowers 
and organisations of imposing such a general duty, mainly because it does not 
make sense to impose a duty on someone to put themselves at risk, and because 
a general duty to raise concern can only work if the acts of wrongdoing can be 
clearly described and it can be unambiguously prescribed who is expected to 
know of such behaviour. Nevertheless, Moberly and Wylie (2011) show that 
more than 96% of US companies formulate whistleblowing as a duty in their 
codes of ethics. In the European sample of Hassink et al (2007), this was 66%. In 
our sample we could only find an implicit hint at such a duty in the wording used 
by Umicore, stating it is considered a responsibility of employees that they will 
raise a concern. The opposite is found in the Delhaize policy, which explicitly 
states employees are under no obligation to report and those who do not report 
will not be sanctioned for not reporting. This however does not rule out that for 
the companies we researched, subsidiaries in the USA might use different 
wording in their codes of ethics. 
Nevertheless, introducing an internal whistleblowing policy is not always that 
obvious in Belgium. A recent example is that of CASA, a home decoration retailer, 
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who announced early September 2012 that it would implement a hotline for 
employees to disclose information on other employees' unethical behaviour. The 
management of CASA came to that decision after it suspected up to one third of 
thefts from its stores were committed by staff. Management states it has the 
responsibility for the well-being of the company and its employees (De 
Standaard 2012). Reactions have been mixed, with the main opposition coming 
from the unions who believe the hotline will create a climate of suspicion and 
fear (RTBF 2012). 
When Fortis Bank introduced an internal hotline in 2005 to comply with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), this was immediately opposed by union 
representatives within the bank (Munster 2005). They stated it was an attempt 
to install a tell-tale culture, and made a complaint with the Belgian Privacy 
Commission. Earlier that year, a case in Germany and one in France saw labour 
unions win similar complaints in labour court. This prompted the Belgian 
Privacy Commission to formulate a position on internal whistleblowing systems 
(Belgian Privacy Commission 2006). 
The Privacy Commission focuses in its advice on the risks involved when 
processing personal data as an inevitable part of operating a whistleblowing 
policy. Its advice states it aims to find a balance between the interests of the 
organisation, the whistleblower, and the accused.18 It reaches that balance by 
commenting on a number of dimensions, including proportionality, 
transparency, and the individual's right to access, change, and delete data on 
oneself. The Commission acknowledges that SOX stipulations are not something 
US listed companies cannot comply with, thus it sees any (foreign) legislation 
requiring companies to have whistleblowing policies as a good reason to have 
one. 
On the other hand, the Commission does formulate specific stipulations as to 
what kind of policies it deems fit to balance the interests of the various parties it 
sees as relevant. For example, the Commission is obviously worried about the 
guarantees whistleblowing policies can offer to keep the identity of the 
                                                        
18 Our translation of 'de organisatie, de klokkenluider, en beklaagde.' Note that 
the advice omits the public interest. 
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whistleblower confidential. Policies must specify categories of staff that have 
access to that data, and a list of these categories must be made available to the 
Commission (Belgian Privacy Commission 2006: 4 fn2). 
Further, the advice stipulates that there must be an explicit policy specifying 
different modi and scope of disclosures, processes behind the disclosure channel, 
and sanction for justified and unjustified reports. It also requires that employees 
must be sufficiently informed about this. Further stipulations include that 
anonymous reporting should not be advertised, nor should there be any duty on 
employees to report wrongdoing. A hotline should only be a complementary 
channel of last resort. Finally, only specialised staff should be mandated to 
receive complaints or reports of wrongdoing. The reason the Commission makes 
this stipulation is that it must be staff that is able to work independently enough 
from the day-to-day management so it could not be pressured into revealing 
personal data about whistleblowers or the accused. Hence the advice from the 
Belgian Privacy Commission is in line with the guidance from the European 
Group on Data Protection (the 29 Group). However, this advice often contradicts 
other authoritative guidelines on the issue (see Vandekerckhove and Lewis 2012 
for a detailed analysis). 
  
 42 
Transparency International Belgium – Providing an Alternative to Silence 
 
6.3. Do corporate policies work? 
6.3.1. How does management think about whistleblowing? 
If C-level management and boards think about internal whistleblowing channels, 
it is in terms of a risk management tool, five expert interviewees said. Two of 
them suggested that engineering type of businesses were more likely to see 
raising a concern internally as a normal practice. These types of professionals 
seemed to have a safety driven notion of risk management, rather than a 
financial one. However, another interviewee said the issue of internal 
whistleblowing is not at all seen as a pressing one at Enterprise Risk 
Management level. This confirms an international tendency (Tsahuridu 2011). 
The idea of protecting the whistleblower from reprisals is a scary one for some 
managers, according to four of our interviewees. There is fear for negative media 
coverage and its impact on the company should things escalate. There is also fear 
that it would function as a channel for false and malicious accusations. One 
interviewee said that whereas management might be interested in what kind of 
malpractice is going on, they are not interested in protecting those who give that 
information. Another interviewee said that managers want to know what goes 
wrong in their organisations, but they have no clue as to what employees who 
raise a concern go through. 
Our interviewees also mentioned that some managers think their organisation 
can do without internal whistleblowing. However, in a moment of crisis these 
managers quickly change their minds, especially in publicly traded companies. 
Another interviewee said that companies are constantly being bombarded with 
consultants who want to implement such procedures, yet managers and 
employees are often annoyed by that pressure. 
 
6.3.2. Who is in favour; who is opposed? 
In the cases we mentioned earlier of Fortis and Casa implementing a 
whistleblowing policy, it was labour unions who opposed this and who launched 
a negative media campaign. One interviewee explained that unions have 
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difficulty with anything that relates to compliance. Another interviewee said that 
whereas audits love it, unions hate it. However, two other expert interviewees 
had a very different view on the union position. Unions are not ‘per definition’ 
opposed to internal whistleblowing procedures. It depends on the relationship 
between management and union representation within a company. ‘Labour 
union’, like ‘management’, are not monolith categories. Within some companies 
unions have been pioneering. In other companies they have been laggards. 
There was general agreement among the interviewees that compliance officers 
and audit departments are perhaps, within organisations, the biggest supporters 
of internal whistleblowing. One interviewee found this obvious as such 
procedures belong to their core business. Another interviewee said that 
compliance was definitely a supporter, but only when this existed as a stand-
alone and independent function within a company. 
But there were also more nuanced position about who is in favour and who is 
not. One interviewee said that management seems to develop in inclination 
towards a ‘USA-styled structures and procedures approach’, but work floor 
employees want a much more pragmatic approach. Another interviewee found 
that top management is blocking any real implementation of internal procedures 
because they know they will have to deal with sensitive information and human 
relations type of conflicts that are hard to resolve. Finally, one of our 
interviewees was of the opinion that compliance and ethics officers are often 
themselves the problem. Their training is far too legalistic and hence they only 
think in terms of shielding the employer from liability. 
 
6.3.3. Hotlines? 
There was a general agreement among the interviewees that whistleblowing 
hotlines are very rarely used, and why this is the case. An expert said that some 
managers reason that if hotlines are not used, it means these systems do not 
work, and hence one does not need them. These managers very rarely ask the 
question why hotlines are not being used. The main reason according to our 
interviewees was that there is a lack of trust in the processes behind such 
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hotlines. Interviewees acknowledged that very often this lack of trust is fully 
justified. There is far too little follow-up to make these hotlines credible: 
managers are not held responsible for encouraging their staff to raise concerns, 
it remains unclear who runs these hotlines, and there is a lack of visible results. 
Hotlines are often introduced through a one-off awareness campaign. Hotlines 
that are integrated into a continued risk management communication have more 
success.  
However, interviewees said that this does not imply that Belgian private sector 
workers do not raise concerns. They do, but are very reluctant to do so through a 
hotline. Instead, they prefer to do this informally. They would go to the 
compliance officer in person with their concern, adding ‘I didn’t say this, but now 
you know’. Or they would simply raise their concern with someone they trust, 
even if that is someone who is not mandated to take action. This is an exponent 
of the preference to resolve things locally, and pragmatically. While two 
interviewees thought that the fact that concerns are raised is more important 
that raising them through the appropriate procedure, three other experts gave 
good reasons why an informal approach is not appropriate. First, if a concern is 
raised with the wrong people (who are not mandated to investigate and correct 
malpractice) it is not safe to assume that the ‘message will find its way to the 
right place’. It would require very receptive management for that to happen. 
Secondly, this does not endorse open communication. On the contrary, assuming 
informal networks and channels will work entails a risk of feeding gossip and 
deteriorating culture. Thirdly, some interviewees said that not having formal 
channels leave an internal whistleblower more at risk to reprisals. 
There was a very strong agreement among the interviewees that even if hotlines 
are very rarely used, it is still necessary to have them as a channel of last resort. 
Interviewees mentioned: that more sensitive issues required more objective 
(and more ‘distant’) channels, and that it is useful if other recipients (other 
channels) have concern with regard to their own autonomy and independence. 
Another position was that having a clear procedure including a hotline is a 
strong communication of vision on ‘how this organisation wants to deal with 
concerns’. It is absolutely needed if the vision is to find its way into the 
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organisational culture (as pattern of behaviour). Clear guidelines and clearly 
defined norms lead to a lower threshold for employees to raise a concern openly 
and directly. In that sense, a clear and strong internal whistleblowing policy can 
result in a lesser need to use the procedures, because just having them clear and 
strong encourages an open debate culture. 
 
6.4. Ways forward 
The stipulation in the 2009 Corporate Governance Code for listed companies, 
along with the reporting obligations imposed by the law of 6 April 2010 seems to 
have considerable effect. Listed companies must write something on their 
internal control systems in their Corporate Governance Charter. However, 
companies tend to write the minimum necessary to comply. Whereas a 
considerable numbers of companies have internal whistleblowing policies, it is 
often found in their codes of conduct. Companies should not simply refer to these 
codes in their charter but also include some details on their internal policies. 
Although this might not change management practice immediately, it would at 
least be a stronger pledge to take internal whistleblowing policies seriously as an 
internal control system. In connection to that, we noticed a considerable 
variation in wording and detail of the internal whistleblowing policy, at least 
with regard to what information companies make publicly available. At this 
stage, we regard this variation as a positive feature because it implies that 
companies that do write such policies are not simply copying each others 
rhetoric. Whereas there are no guarantees that what companies write about 
their internal whistleblowing policies is representative of the attitudes towards 
whistleblowing of their management and boards, these stakeholders have made 
it clear that they find it necessary to exchange examples, stories, and best 
practices on corporate governance arrangements (Commissie Corporate 
Governance 2012). Hence there is an opportunity to invite employers to share 
experiences with regard to running internal whistleblowing procedures. A 
weakness related to the corporate governance topic is that the Code Buysse II, 
the corporate governance code for non-listed companies makes no mention at all 
of internal whistleblowing policies. Although such a mentioning would not make 
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it legally binding for non-listed companies to describe their internal controls, 
again it would symbolically strengthen internal whistleblowing policies as an 
essential feature of good governance. 
Leading on from the opportunity of discussing examples and best practices, there 
is a need to develop a discourse of how internal whistleblowing fits within a 
Belgian culture. It is quite common to see 'our culture' used as a counter-
argument to whistleblowing policies (Vandekerckhove 2006) but this is always 
an over-statement (Park et al 2008). Likewise in Belgium. References have been 
made that whistleblowing is not 'in our culture' (Munster and Padoan 2005, Hein 
Lannoy cited in Leys and Vandekerckhove 2010). However, reality is more 
nuanced. We learn from our expert interviews that there is a general dislike or at 
least unease with Anglo-like procedures (USA or UK), where a hotline is the most 
obvious way to implement internal whistleblowing. There was consensus among 
our interviewees that these are currently not working in Belgium. Reasons given 
for that were a distrust among employees of the processes behind such hotlines, 
and the lack of seriousness in promoting or communicating them. Although this 
suggests a cultural barrier to hotlines, one of the key findings from the expert 
interviews is that it is definitely not the case that Belgian employees opt to 
remain silent when they perceive malpractice in their work place. There was 
general agreement that employees do raise their concerns, but prefer informal 
routes. Many expert interviewees saw this as worrisome because it implies that 
concerns are often raised in the wrong place - with people they trust but who are 
not mandated to investigate or correct wrongdoing. It was also suggested this 
could lead to increased gossip, and could deteriorate organisational culture. Most 
experts held the view that a hotline is nevertheless important, either as a channel 
of last resort or as a way to communicate management's vision on raising 
concerns. It is important to further develop with Belgian managers, board 
members, compliance officers, and HR practitioners good practice examples of 
implementing formal whistleblowing channels other than hotlines. There is 
much to be gained from this. It could generate culturally feasible and trusted 
internal whistleblowing policies that ensure concerns are raised with people 
who can action correcting malpractices, whilst avoiding the 'uncomfortable' use 
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of hotlines. Employers have every reason to engage in such a dialogue. After all, 
the UCB example shows that it is not impossible that foreign powers impose a 
hotline policy regardless of Belgian fears or distrust. 
A similar separate dialogue amongst labour union representatives would be 
helpful to avoid 'smear campaigns' against the notion of whistleblowing as 
'employees raising concern about malpractice in their workplace'. This results in 
enforcing negative connotations to whistleblowing in the press. In contradiction 
to the impression given by media reports that unions are opposed to internal 
whistleblowing, expert interviewees did not agree unions were always opposed. 
Much depends on the existing relation between management and union 
representatives, and it is crucial to discuss the policy with union representatives 
before implementing it. One possible aim of a union dialogue might be a 
framework of requirements for internal whistleblowing policies from a union 
point of view. A further aid to bridge management and union attitudes to internal 
whistleblowing might come from the advice of the Belgian Privacy Commission. 
Its preoccupation with confidentiality, and balancing interests of organisation, 
whistleblower, and accused could be used as a starting point for a dialogue 
towards balancing both risk management and protection dimensions of 
whistleblowing. 
Such a balance is needed. Management tends to underestimate the difficulties 
whistleblowers can face before and after they raise their concerns inside their 
organisations, and are generally worried that whistleblower protection would 
attract abuse and malicious intent. In that light it is important to develop a long-
term strategy to strengthen whistleblower protection through legislation. The 
strategy has to be long-term because there is no leverage for short-term effective 
legislative success. One huge barrier is the burden of proof being on the 
administrative employee to show an employer is abusing their 'right to dismiss'. 
This makes the prospects of a dismissed administrative employee whistleblower 
to win their case almost nil. An seemingly obvious route to strengthen the 
position of the whistleblower is to enforce this through a broadening of the anti-
harassment legislation. An internal whistleblower who experiences reprisal 
could then make a complaint about these reprisals with the confidential advisors. 
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However, it would be unwise to opt for that route to strengthen the position of 
whistleblowers. First because an employee needs to bring a strong case 
(including witnesses) showing specific behavioural patterns, which do not 
necessarily fit whistleblower experiences. Second because a confidential 
advisor's first aim is to find reconciliation. The confidential advisor's position is 
not strong enough to investigate, correct, and sanction malpractice in the 
workplace. A much stronger strategy to strengthen the whistleblower position 
would be to use Art 17 Par 3b of the law of 3 July 1978 as a leverage to clearly 
position the employee who raises a concern about malpractices as someone who 
acts in the public interest. The referred to paragraph imposes a duty on 
employees to refrain from committing or co-operating in acts of unfair 
competition. 
In line with this, awareness needs to be increased with the general public, 
employees, and management that workplace malpractices have a wider societal 
impact than merely job satisfaction. From our expert interviews we learned that 
the issue of whistleblowing is not on the radar of enterprise risk management in 
Belgium, and that not only is there a lack of integrity training provisions for 
compliance officers in general (TI 2012: 294), Belgian compliance officers have a 
background which is too legalistic. The implication of that is that they too often 
lack the 'soft skills' necessary in handling potential whistleblowing conflicts. 
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7. SWOTs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Public sector 
Strengths 
 Good practice at Flemish level 
 Expertise and trouble-shooting (IAVA) 
 Evidence of pragmatic piecemeal 
legislative changes based on policy 
review (Flemish Ombudsperson 
review of 2010 and Flemish Decree of 
24 October 2012) 
 
Weaknesses 
 Lack of institutional structure 
(investigatory body at federal level) 
 Lack of legislative initiatives at 
Walloon level 
 
Opportunities 
 International pressure 
 Critical mass at federal level? (spill-
over to politicians?) 
 If whistleblowing legislation would be 
passed at federal level, this might take 
away fear on Walloon side? (Flemish 
fear for abuse seems diminished) 
 Early signs of political will at Walloon 
level 
 Advice Council of State 
 
Threats 
 Over-zealous procedures in proposal 
at federal level which would work 
against whistleblower trust 
 Economic recession and 
communitarian issues around 
constitutional reforms towards 
increased autonomy for the regions 
might distract political attention 
away from good governance 
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Table 6. Private sector 
Strengths 
 2009 Corporate Governance Code 
requires listed companies to comment 
on systems through which employees 
can safely raise concerns 
 there is variation in the approach 
taken by companies towards internal 
whistleblowing 
 Belgian Privacy Commission has a 
position on internal policies, 
emphasising guarantees for 
confidential reporting 
Weaknesses 
 no reference is made to systems for 
employees raising concerns in the 
Corporate Governance Code for non-
listed companies (Code Buysse II) 
 lack of protective measures for 
whistleblowers 
 bad recent media coverage (CASA) 
 the issue is not on the ERM radar 
Opportunities 
 employees in Belgium do not remain 
silent; concerns are raised (but rather 
informally) 
 employers are eager to discuss best 
practices with regard to further 
implementing the 2009 Corporate 
Governance Code 
 internal whistleblowing policies can be 
externally imposed (e.g. UCB), the 
implication of which is that having a 
policy can become a more widespread 
practice regardless of national debate 
or preferences 
 Par. 3b of Art. 17 of the law of 3 July 
1978 imposes a duty on employees to 
refrain from committing or co-
operating in acts of unfair competition. 
Threats 
 people raise concern in the wrong 
place (informally), which can lead to 
gossip or the concern not being taken 
up) 
 there is a general dislike or at least 
unease with Anglo-like procedures 
 managers tend to fear abuse of 
protective measures 
 there have been cases where labour 
unions campaign against internal 
policies 
 perhaps the most obvious route for 
increasing protection would be 
through the anti-harassment 
legislation, and hence through the 
confidential advisors. However, their 
position within companies remains 
weak. 
 there is a lack of training for 
compliance officers in general, and 
more specific for the 'soft skills' 
involved in handling whistleblowing 
conflicts. 
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8. Conclusions and suggested action plan 
From the research presented in this report, we can draw the following 
conclusions with regard to whistleblowing in the Belgian public sector: 
 there is good practice at Flemish level: there is good cooperation between 
recipients at different levels, and policy reviews are successfully 
translated at political level, 
 there is an emerging political and institutional will at the Walloon level to 
understand whistleblowing in a more positive light, and it is very 
promising to see these wills emerge at the same time, 
 at federal level, the institutional drive that has existed for quite some time 
seems to make some progress: there is an integrity network across 
departments, and ideas from the institutional side are finally seeing some 
translation to the political side (i.e. the new Bill and the calls for an 
investigative body). 
 
From the research presented in this report, we can draw the following 
conclusions with regard to whistleblowing in the Belgian private sector: 
 internal whistleblowing has been taken up in the context of corporate 
governance for listed companies but not for non-listed companies, 
 there is further advice from an authoritative body (Belgian Privacy 
Commission) which takes into account and attempts to balance concerns 
from various stakeholders, 
 whereas there is a general unease with hotlines, the Belgian culture is one 
where employees raise their concerns about workplace malpractice 
informally, and often unsuccessful, 
 there is a need and a demand for developing good practice examples on 
governance, including internal whistleblowing policies, 
 there are no legal protection measures for private sector whistleblowers 
in Belgium, nor is there a viable short-term route to legally strengthen the 
position of whistleblowers. 
 
From our research, and the resulting SWOT analysis, we suggest the following 
action points towards successful whistleblowing in the Belgian public sector: 
1. Strengthen the request at the political level for an appropriately mandated 
investigatory body at federal level. 
2. At the Walloon level, establish an integrity network at institutional level. 
3. Support the monitoring of the advice and help line at Flemish level, and where 
possible and desirable publish results. 
4. Gather success stories of internal whistleblowing. 
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5. Organize an annual cross regional/federal conference on integrity, to support 
institutional momentum, and facilitate the traveling of ideas from institutional to 
political level. 
From our research, and the resulting SWOT analysis, we suggest the following 
action points towards successful whistleblowing in the Belgian private sector: 
6. Facilitate a dialogue among managers, board members, compliance officers, 
and HR practitioners on how to build more formal and trusted channels for 
employees to raise concerns. 
7. Facilitate a dialogue among union representatives on conditions and 
characteristics of acceptable internal whistleblowing policies. 
8. Develop a long-term viable strategy for strengthening the position of 
whistleblowers through legal protection. 
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Appendix: Charts 
Title: Ombudsdecreet 7 July 1998 (amended by Decree 7 May 2004 to 
implement whistleblower protection, further amended by Decree on 24 October 
2012), accompanied by protocols of 4 July 2005 between the Ombudsperson and 
the Flemish government, and of 17 May 2006 between the Ombudsperson and 
IAVA. 
Protocols have not been amended yet to reflect changes by Decree of 24 October 
2012. 
 Yes No Partial Notes 
Broad definition 
of whistleblowing 
X  X Limitations to scope were removed by Decree 24 Oct 
2012) 
Broad definition 
of whistleblower 
  X Civil servant, apprentice, or contractual employee of 
a Flemish governmental body. 
Broad definition 
of retribution 
protection 
  X Protection when reporting to the Ombudsperson: 
against dismissal and disciplinairy measures related 
to the reporting. Burden of proof is with the 
employer. 
Protection extends until two years after the end of 
the investigation. 
Internal reporting 
mechanism 
X   Internal audit (IAVA) 
Whistleblower 
participation 
 X   
Rewards system  X   
Protection of 
confidentiality 
X   Confidentiality extended to reporting to 
Ombudsperson (Decree 24 Oct 2012) 
Anonymous 
reports accepted 
 X   
No sanction for 
misguided 
reporting 
  X Deliberately false reporting will lead to informing 
the head of the department of such reporting. 
Whistleblower 
complaints 
authority 
X   Ombudsperson 
Genuine day in 
court 
 X   
Full range of 
remedies 
X   Protection against dismissal and disciplinairy 
measures related to the reporting (until two years 
after end of investigation). Decree 24 Oct 2012 adds 
re-employment in another organisation with the 
Flemish public sector. 
Penalties for 
retaliation 
 X   
Involvement of 
multiple actors 
 X    
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Title: Wetsvoorstel betreffende de melding van een vermoedelijke 
integriteitsschending in de federale administratieve overheden door haar 
personeelsleden. 
Proposition de loi relative à la dénonciation d’une attainte présumée à l’intégrité 
dans une autorité administrative fédérale par un membre de son personnel. 
Belgian Senate (5-217/2) 
Law proposal on the reporting of a suspected breach of integrity within the 
federal administrative agencies by employees. 
 Yes No Partial Notes 
Broad definition 
of whistleblowing 
X   Suspected breaches of legislation, decisions, 
circulars, internal regulations and internal 
procedures, inacceptable risks to life, health, or 
safety of persons or the environment, breach of 
professional duties, and advising or ordering 
someone to commit a breach of integrity. It does not 
cover discrimination 
Broad definition 
of whistleblower 
X   Civil servant, contractual employees, apprentice, 
personnel working on a service contract. 
Borad definition 
of retribution 
protection 
X   Protection for whistleblower and for those who give 
witness during investigation. 
Protection granted by Ombudsperson: against 
dismissal, not extending a temporary contract,  not 
extending a probationary period into a temporary 
contract, relocation or denial of relocation when 
requested, disciplinary measures, denying salary 
increase, withholding opportunities for career 
advancement or other resources, denial of annual 
leave, giving a negative evaluation. 
Internal reporting 
mechanism 
X   To confidential advisor, in writing. 
Whistleblower 
participation 
  X This is intended but not that obvious 
Rewards system   X  
Protection of 
confidentiality 
X   On whistleblower’s request when reporting to 
Ombudsman. Always in internal route. 
Anonymous 
reports accepted 
 X   
No sanction for 
misguided 
reporting 
  X Disciplinary investigation following a deliberately 
false report. 
Whistleblower 
complaints 
authority 
X   Federal Ombudsperson, reporting to parliament. 
Genuine day in 
court 
 X   
Full range of 
remedies 
 X   
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Penalties for 
retaliation 
 X   
Involvement of 
multiple actors 
 X   
 
Title: Artikel 29 Wetboek van Strafvorderingen; Article 29 Code d’Instruction 
Criminelle (17 November 1808) – Article 29 Criminal Law 
 Yes No Partial Notes 
Broad definition 
of whistleblowing 
 X  Imposes a duty to report crimes come across during 
one’s mandate, to the Crown Prosecutor 
Broad definition 
of whistleblower 
X   All civil servants and public officials, at any level of 
government 
Borad definition 
of retribution 
protection 
 X  none 
Internal reporting 
mechanism 
  X For those working in tax administration, crimes 
related to tax must first be reported to one’s head of 
department. 
Whistleblower 
participation 
 X   
Rewards system  X   
Protection of 
confidentiality 
 X   
Anonymous 
reports accepted 
 X   
No sanction for 
misguided 
reporting 
 X   
Whistleblower 
complaints 
authority 
 X   
Genuine day in 
court 
 X   
Full range of 
remedies 
 X   
Penalties for 
retaliation 
 X   
Involvement of 
multiple actors 
 X   
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